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A NEW LOCATION
On October 1, 1943, Fordham University School of Law moved to its new
quarters in the Vincent Building. This fifteen-story building at 302 Broadway,
erected some years ago by the Astor Estate, is a modern fire-proof building
ideally suited to the needs of legal education. It is only a block from the Civic
Center, which contains the New York County Court House, the Federal Court
House, Surrogate's Court, and other public buildings. The transportation lines
to all parts of the city are within two blocks of the new location. The Vincent
Building is situated at the southeast corner- of Broadway and Duane Street,
with a frontage of 110 feet on Duane Street and 51 feet on Broadway. Fordham
University by the purchase of the new building will double the amount of its
present downtown space. The School of Law will occupy the upper floors of the
building, with its Law Library located on the fifteenth floor.
RECENT DECISIONS
CoNsPRAcY-CIviL LIABILITY-SPLITTING REAL ESTATE BROKER'S COMMISSIONS.-
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, brought an action against the vendor and vendee of cer-
tain real estate to recover damages alleged to have been caused by their conspiracy
to prevent the plaintiff from completing the sale of the property and thereby earn--
ing his commission. As an authorized agent of the vendor, plaintiff had interested the
defendant vendee as a buyer upon terms mutually satisfactory to both parties but the
buyer refused to authorize the plaintiff to carry an offer to the seller because the
plaintiff would not accede to the buyer's demand to turn over the major portion
of his expected commission to the buyer. Plaintiff gave notice of the buyer's demand
to the vendor and that the plaintiff expected the vendor to protect him in the matter.
The sale was later consummated upon practically identical terms through another
broker who divided the commission with the buyer. The plaintiff had been nego-
tiating with prospective purchasers, including the defendant purchaser for almost a
year. The jury found that plaintiff would have earned his commission except, for
the acts of the defendants in carrying out the conspiracy. From a verdict for plaintiff
defendants appeal. Held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. Keviczky v. Lorber, 290
N. Y. 297, 49 N. E. (2d) 146 (1943).
The events on which this action is based occurred prior to April 25, 1941, the
effective date of the amendment to Section 442 of the Real Property Law of New
York' prohibiting the splitting of commissions by a broker with a purchaser. Al-
though the statute, as formerly in effect, prohibited the splitting of commissions by
brokers with certain persons,2 it was held not to apply to the parties to the transac-
1. N. Y. Real Prop. Law, § 442.
2. N. Y. Real Prop. Law, § 442. This section prohibited a real estate broker from pay-
ing "any part of a fee, commission or other compensation received by the broker to any
person for any service, help or aid rendered .... by such person to the broker in buying,
selling; exchanging, leasing, renting or negotiating a logn upon any real estate, unless such
person be a duly licensed real estate salesman regularly employed by such broker... "
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tion3 and an agreement to split a commission with an owner or purchaser was not
inherently illegal.4
The case is unusual in that in a situation of this kind the purchaser is not ordinarily.
joined in the suit, the action being brought in the great majority of cases against
the principal for recovery of commissions on the ground of breach of contract.
It is well settled law that in order to sustain an action against the vendor for com-
missions on the sale of real estate the broker must prove that a contract for the
purchase and sale of the real estate has been executed 5 or that he has procured a
purchaser ready, willing and able to buy upon terms prescribed by the owner.6
In other words, "the duty assumed by the broker is to bring the minds of the
buyer and seller to an agreement for a sale, and the price and terms on which it
is to be made, and until that is done his right to commissions does not accrue."7 If
the minds of the parties have actually met and the broker is the procuring cause of
the agreement, then he is entitled to his commission, even though the seller later
fails to consummate the sale.8 However, he is entitled to no compensation for his
unsuccessful efforts, even though he may have introduced to each other parties who
otherwise would never have met or may in other ways have planted the seeds from
which others reap the harvest. 9 Where no time for the continuance of the agency
is fixed, either principal or agent may terminate it at will. The principal is under
no obligation to wait until the broker's efforts reach fruition and he violates no right
of the broker by selling to the first party who will meet his price even if it is the
party with whom the broker has been negotiating.' 0
Since he has not erhployed the broker, the purchaser is, of course, not liable for the
payment of commissions on the transaction unless he expressly agrees to pay them."
Furthermore, he may negotiate with a broker and, providing he has not bound him-
self to the deal, may break off the negotiations for any reason at all and deal through
another broker with regard to the same subject matter without incurring liability
to the first broker.' 2 Because of the purchaser's freedom to deal with whomever he
3. J. L. Holding Co. v. Reis, 240 N. Y. 424, 148 N. E. 623 (1925), on the ground that
within the meaning of the section the owner or purchaser does not render service to the
broker.
4. Id. at page 426, 148 N. E. at 623. Where a broker is employed merely as a middle-
man for the purpose of bringing the parties together and has nothing to do with fixing the
terms of the bargain, he may exact compensation from both. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 391, Comment (d). ,
5. Farrell v. Massapequa Holding Corp., 222 App. Div. 815, 226 N. Y. Supp. 810
(2d Dep't 1928).
6. Davidson v. Stocky, 202 N. Y. 423, 95 N. E. 753 (1911); Saum v. Capital Realty
Development Corp., 268 N. Y. 335, 197 N. E. 303 (1935) ; 4 WImSTON, CONTRACTS (4th ed.
1936) 2876.
7. Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 382-383 (1881).
8. 2 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1912) § 2447; Moses v, Burling, 31 N. Y. 462 (1865).
9. Wylie v. Marine National Bank, 61 N. Y. 415 (1875).
-10. Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 383 (1881) ; Sampson v. Graves, 199
App. Div. 762, 192 N. Y. Supp. 114 (1st Dep't 1922).
11. Grossman v. Herman, 266 N. Y. 249, 194 N. E. 694 (1935).
12. Clinchy v. Grandview Dairy, 283 N. Y. 39, 27 N. E. (2d) 425 (1940).
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pleases, where more than one broker is authorized by the principal to procure a pur-
chaser, the principal must close the transaction through, and is liable for commis-
sions to, the broker selected by the purchaser, even though in the course of the nego-
tiations the latter has discussed the transaction with ,other brokers employed by the
owner.' 3 Moreover, it would seem to follow that no obligation rests upon the prin-
cipal to inform other brokers, with whom the purchaser has dealt, of the closing of
the deal.
In the principal case, the plaintiff had neither brought about the execution of a
contract of sale nor produced a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to buy
upon terms prescribed by the owner. Since the purchaser refused to deal further with
the plaintiff after the latter refused to meet his demand with respect to the commis-
sion, no meeting of the minds of the owner and the prospective buyer was brought
about through the efforts of the plaintiff and no liability for commissions either on
the part of the owner or of the prospective buyer was created thereby. It is evident
that if the plaintiff in this case had resorted to the ordinary remedy Sf an action
in contract, there would have been no recovery against the vendor, and certainly
none against the purchaser.
Plaintiff, however, does 'not assert a right of action in contract. He makes no pre-
tense that he procured a purchaser or that he is entitled to commissions on the sale
actually consummated. In fact, he expressly disclaims any right to recovery on that
ground. His claim is that through an illegal and fraudulent conspiracy by the de-
fendants he was prevented from procuring a purchaser for the property, and that,
except for the overt acts of the alleged conspirators (including consummation of the
sale of the property under circumstances enabling the purchaser to share in the com-
missions), he would have procured the purchaser and would have earned his com-
/ mission. In examining whether such allegations are sufficient to constitute a right of
action in conspiracy, it is helpful to review briefly the law on that subject.
A conspiracy has been defined as ". . . a combination of two or more persons
by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose
not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means."' 4 In a criminal
prosecution for conspiracy, the unlawful combination and confederacy are the gist
of the offense and not the crime agreed upon.' 5 In civil suits for actionable torts the
reverse is true, the general rule being that a conspiracy cannot be made the subject
of a civil action unless something is done which, without the conspiracy, would have
given a right of action.16 The meie allegation that there was a, conspiracy to commit
13. Sampson v. Ottinger, 93 App. Div. 226, 87 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1904).
14. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U, S. 443, 465; 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 176 (1920).
15. May, Law of Crimes (Sears, Weih~fen ed. 1938) 176; Commonwealth v. Dean, 109
Mass. 349 (1872). But a statute may require proof of an overt act, see N. Y. PENAL LAW,
§ 583; People v. Hines, 284 N. Y. 93, 29 N. E. (2d) 483 (1940).
16. National Protective Assoc. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902); Green
v. Davies, 182 N. Y. 499, 503, 75 N. E. 536, 537 (1905); Hertley v. Simmons [1898] 1
Q. B. 181. For the minority view holding that the conspiracy itself constitutes a substan-
tive tort, see Allis Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders'.Union, 150 Fed. 155, 176 (C. C. E. D.
Wis. 1906). See also Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime and as a Tort (1907) 7 COL. L. Rxv.
229; Burdick, The Tort of Conspiracy (1908) 8 CoL. L. Rxv. 117; Charlesworth, Conspira-
cy as a Ground of Liability in Tort (1920) 36 L. Q. REv. 38; 23 L. Q. Rv. 364 (1907).
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a wrong without specifying the same, does not constitute a cause of action. "The
gravamen is fraud and damage, and not the conspiracy."'-7 The allegation and proof
of conspiracy in a civil action is important only to connect a defendant with the
transaction and to charge him with the acts and declarations of his co-conspirators
where otherwise he could not have been implicated.' 8 The significance of the con-
spiracy, therefore, consists in the fact that it gives the person injured a remedy
against parties not otherwise connected with the wrong.' It also constitutes an
aggravating circumstance which tends to increase the plaintiff's recovery.19 The
important fact is that the principles which govern the substantive wrong alleged are
the same, whether the substantive wrong is alleged to have originated in a conspiracy
or to have been committed without the aid of another. In fact the conspiracy need
not even be pleaded in order to admit proof of it for the purpose of connecting
another defendant with the commission of the wrong.20
Since the conspiracy is usually conceived and executed in secret, direct proof is
seldom attainable. The conspiracy, therefore, can be established by circumstantial
evidence, consisting usually of the disconnected acts of the conspirators which when
taken in connection with each other tend to show a combination to secure a particu-
lar result,2 ' but the evidence must be such that the inference therefrom is reasonable,
probable and unstrained.2 2 No proof of preliminary meetings of the defendants or
of a definite plan or agreement entered into by them to injure the plaintiff is essen-
tial to establish the combination. It is sufficient if the proof shows such a concert of
action in the commission of the unlawful overt act or such other facts and circum-
stances from which the natural inference arises that the unlawful overt act was in
furtherance of a common design, intention, and purpose of the alleged conspirators
to commit the same. Nevertheless, disconnected circumstances, any one of which,
or all of which, are just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful
undertaking are insufficient to establish the unlawful agreement.m
Under the above rules of law, to sustain an action for conspiracy it would be
necessary for the plaintiff in the principal case to prove that the defendants planned
17. Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y. 454, 466, 20 N. E. 376, 379 (1889) ; Nalle v.
Oyster, 230 U. S. 165, 183, 33 Sup. Ct. 1043, 1052 (1913). In Quinn v. Leathem, [19011
A. C. 495, 530, Lord Brampton stated that "a conspiracy to do harm to another is,
from the moment of its formaion, unlawful and criminal, though not actionable unless
damage is the result."
'18. Boston v. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461, 23 N. E. 210 (1890); Bush v. Murray, 209 App.
Div. 563, 205 N. Y. Supp. 21 (1st Dep't 1924).
19. 1 CooLEY, ToiTs (3d ed.) 211-212.
20. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104 (N. Y. 1845); Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y.
454, 20 N. E. 546 (1889).
21. Heughes v. Board of Eaucation, 37 App. Div. 180, 183, 55 N. Y. Supp. 799, 802
(4th Dep't 1899) ; People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324, 26 N. E. 267 (1891).
22. Beers v. McNaught, 175 App. Div. 643, 647, 162 N. Y. Supp. 514, 517 (1st Dep't
1916); Lynch v. Gibson, 254 App. Div. 47, 51, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 672 (1938), affirmed 279
N. Y. 634, 18 N. E. (2d) 36 (1939).
23. JONES, LAW OF FVIDENCF IN C=-m CASES (3d ed. 1924) 1426; Dart v. McDonald,
107 Wash. 537, 182°Pac. 628 (1919).
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in concert to accomplish an unlawful result and acted in pursuance thereof, or, if
the result were lawful, that the scheme was carried out by acts that were tortious.
The plaintiff would also have to prove that he suffered leghl damage directly result-
ing from such acts. The result which the plaintiff charges the defendants conspired to
bring about was to deprive him of the opportunity to procure a purchaser for the
property and thereby prevent him from earning a commission.24 Unless the plaintiff
had an exclusive agency for the sale of the property or the defendant owner acted
in bad faith in exercising his right to sell independently, this result would not be
unlawful. The agency was not exclusive and after more than a year the plaintiff
had not produced a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy. The defendant vendor
was not obliged to wait beyond a reasonable time, if at all, for the plaintiff to pro-
duce a buyer and violated no right of the plaintiff in-closing the sale through another
,broker. But even if the resulf were not unlawful, the conspiracy might be established
if the overt acts of the defendants in carrying out the alleged conspiracy were un-
lawful. The acts of the defendants consisted of the closing of the sale of the prop-
erty through a broker willing to split his commissions with the purchaser. It is
obvious that the closing of a sale of real estate is not unlawful and, at the time of
the transaction, the splitting of commissions by the broker with the purchaser 'was
not unlawful. It appears that neither the purpose of the alleged conspiracy nor the
means used were criminal or unlawful, and that consequently there was no actionable
conspiracy.
As to the damages claimed, the plaintiff asserted that he was deprived of a valua-
ble asset in his business as a result of the actions of the defendants in refraining
from dealing with him. Since plaintiff disclaimed a right to recover commissions on
the sale actually consummated between the defendants, this asset consisted merely of
the possibility of earning a commission in the event that the property remained on
the market long enough for him to find and produce a purchaser. The possibility that
the plaintiff might have brought about a sale to the defendant vendee while the
plaintiff persisted in his refusal to split the commission must be excluded. Any re-
maining expectancy can hardly be termed an asset, as that word is generally under-
stood. Be that as it may, the loss of such a possibility would seem to be too remote
and conjectural to justify a verdict for damages. 25
24. The substantive nature of the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff in the princi-
pal case should not be confused with the cause of action for wrongfully inducing a breach
of contract. See Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923); Hornstein v.
Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930). Such a theory could not be availed
of by the plaintiff, since he possessed no contract which could be breached. Interference
with a mere expectancy of a legacy has been held not to be actionable even though un-
lawful means are used, Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104 (N. Y. 1845), cf. Rose v. Wright,
286 Mass. 269, 190 N. E. 514 (1934). On the other hand, interference with the probable
formation of a contract stands upon the same footing as interference with the performance
of contracts already formed. In either of the latter cases proof of unlawful means is re-
quired and an agreement to do what one may lawfully do introduces no new element of
unlawfulness. See Huffcut, Interference with Contracts and Business in New York (1905)
18 HA~v. L. REv. 423.
25. Deprivation of the opportunity of earning a profit or award is not generally con-
1943)
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The bare majority of the court upheld the plaintiff's claim that the alleged wrong
charged was actionable and permitted an award of damages equivalent to a com-
mission on the sale. Considering the decision as a precedent confined to the exact
facts of the case, any error committed by the court can have little effect on future
litigation in view of the amendment to the statute which makes the splitting of
commissions unlawful. However, in its broader implications, the decision is hardly to
be treated as academic. The reasoning adopted by the majority of the court, if
applied to analogous situations, raises grave doubts as to the limits which should be
marked out in the action for conspiracy. If the majority's holding means that the
mere combination or agreement to do what is otherwise lawful renders the per-
formance unlawful, certainty in the law calls for the explicit statement of that doc-
trine. The majority opinion states that "no branch of the law seems less clear than
that of conspiracy.", The decision contributes little to the clarification of that law-
or is it that hard cases do make bad law?
CORPORATIONS-SEC. 16 (b) OF THE' SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT O 1934.-
Plaintiffs, stockholders of a corporation, brought a representative action on behalf
of the corporation, which was named as a nominal defendant, against two directors,
who were also the president and vice-president, of the corporation and each of whom
owned approximately 12% of the corporation's stock, pursuant to the provisions
of Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which renders directors,
officers and principal stockholders liable to their corporation for profits realized from
trading in its securities within any six months' period. The facts were stipulated
at the trial and it was admitted that the defendants had made no unfair use of
inside information. The defendants contended not only that the Section was un-
constitutional but that it did not apply to their trading since they had made no
unfair use of inside information. The District Court overruled these contentions and
held the defendants liable to the corporation for the maximum profits shown by
matching their purchases and sales of the corporation's stock during the six months'
period. Upon appeal, held, the. section is constitutional and the defendants are
liable td the corporation for the profits which were correctly computed by the
District Court, Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, 136 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 2d,
1943), cert. den. - U .S. - (1943).
This case is important since it appears to be the first one arising under Section
16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 in which the constitutionality, as
well as the interpretation, of that section has been authoritatively determined.
sidered by the preponderance of American decisions a recoverable item of damages, unless
the plaintiff can prove at least a better than equal chance that the profit will be made.
McCoR uicx, DAxAGEs (1935) 122. In some jurisdictions, notably England, a jury will
be permitted to place a monetary value upon the chance of success, even where the chance
is small, Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K. B. 786, but in no jurisdiction will a recovery
of the total expected profit or award be permitted where there is less than a fifty, per cent
chance of success. Kansas City, M. & 0. R. R. v. Bell, 197 S. W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917). See 46 HARv. L. REV. 696 (1933); 28 CoL. L. REV. 76 (1928).
1. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U.'S. C. A. 78 p (b) (1934). The section, in so far as pertinent to
[Vol. 12
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The constitutional features of the case revolve.chiefly around the commerce and
the due process clauses. The section deals with securities registered on a national
securities exchange2 and it is now established that Congress, under the commerce
clause of the Constitution, has power to regulate transactions on such exchanges.3
Such regulation may even extend to private sales, away from the exchanges, since
the Federal power may reach intrastate activities which affect interstate commerce. 4
Another argument against constitutionality, based upon the due process clause, arises
from the conclusion by the District Court,5 which the Circuit Court of Appeals.
affirmed, that Section 16 (b) requires the forfeiture of profits, even though the trading
resulting in the profit is effected in good faith and without the benefit of inside infor-
mation. A consideration of this argument should be prefaced by an analysis of
the interpretation which the court reached upon the issue of substantive liability.
The issue of greatest interest and importance involved construction of the section.
In two basic respects the language of the section does not make altogether clear the
intent of Congress. The opening phrase of the section0 clearly states the purpose
intended to be achieved by its enactment, but the question remains whether this
statement is intended as a mere preamble or as an enactment of an essential ingredi-
ent of the substantive' wrong condemned. The internal evidence suggested by the
wording of the section points to the former conclusion. In the first place, as the
Court observed, the construction proposed by the defendants would torture the con-
ditional "may" in the opening phrase into a conclusive "shall have" or "has". 7
this discussion, provides: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director; or officer by reason
of his relation to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . .'vithin any period of less
than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part 'of such beneficial owner, director or officer in entering into such
transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for
a period exceeding six months. . . ." The beneficial owner referred to above is described
in § 16 (a) as one "who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per
centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) registered on
a national securities exchange."
2. See note 1, supra.
3. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 303 U. S. 419,
58 Sup. Ct. 678 (1938); Wright v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 112 F. (2d)
89, 94 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Torr, 15 Fed. Supp.
315, 319 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1936), reversed on other grounds, 87 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937); Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1923).
4. U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 460 (1940); U. S. v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 62 Sup. Ct. 523 (1942); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111,
63 Sup. Ct, 82 (1942). Some of the stock transactions involved in the principal case were
effected privately.
5. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 46 Fed. Sup. 758 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1942).
6. See note 1, supra; also Securities Exchange Act § 2, 15 U. S. C. A. 78 (b) (1934).
7. 136 F. (2d) 231, 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); also see People v. Gravenhorst, 32 N. Y.
S. (2d) 760, 767 (1942).
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Secondly, the section declared forfeited any profit from "any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase" by an insider. If the actual use of inside information was required
to be proved, there would be little reason for confining the liability to those defined
as insiders by the Act.8 Moreover, it seems more likely that the objective standard
of proof, the "crude rule of thumb" discussed in Committee hearings,9 evidenced in
the clause declaring immaterial the length of time the insider intended to hold the
security or to refrain from repurchasing it, was also intended to apply to the section
as a whole. Finally, what was most likely the greatest aid to the court in its task
of interpreting Congressional intent was the acknowledged evil resulting from the
misuse of inside information, widely condemned both within,10 and without,,"
Congress, which demanded a dentigerous enactment, not depending for its enforce-
ment upon an almost impossible standard of proof. The requirement of an inquiry
whether actual use was made of inside information, with all the difficulties of
proof it would present, might well emasculate the section. A more reasonable con-
clusion is that Congress merely attempted to remove the temptation to use such in-
formation, not by prohibiting stock trading by insiders, but by destroying the
incentive.
With the section thus accorded a construction dispensing with proof of the actual
u~e of inside information, the defendants questioned it as violating due process.
It was claimed in the District Court that the section deprived them of their prop-
erty by conclusively presuming that they were guilty of a wrong. Unquestionably
"a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a
statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment".
12
Hence, whether the section is worded as a presumption or a positive rule of sub-
stantive law, the same problem of constitutionality is presented.' 3 However worded,
the provision seems to be a proper exercise of Congressional power. The legislative
finding that insiders used their special knowledge for their own advantage must be
taken as true, unless it be completely arbitrary, 14 and as a means adapted to correct
the evil it cannot be said that the provision is "arbitrary and capricious". 15 Jt is true
that the case law does not generally impose upon officers and directors any fiduciary
duty which precludes, them, merely because they are officers and directors from
8. As a matter of fact previous drafts contained provisions making any person, to
whom confidential information was disclosed, liable for profits obtained by the use of
such information. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F. (2d) 231, 236 (1943).
9. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess.,
and S. 56 and S. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 1934, 6557.
10. Report of Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Stock Exchange Practices,
S. Rep. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 62, 63 (1934).
11. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, SECURITY MARKETS (1935); Tracy and MacChesney,
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (1934) 32 MIcrH. L. REv. 1025, 1032, 1056.
12. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 238, 31 Sup. Ct. 145, 151 (1911); Tot v. United
States, 317 U. S. 698, 63 Sup. Ct. 441 (1943).
13. Heinar v: Donnan, 283 U. S. 312, 329, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 362 (1932).
14. U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 58 Sup. Ct. 778 (1938).
15. West Coast Hotel Co.v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 399, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 585 (1937).
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buying and selling the corporation's stock,' 6 and most 'courts, in the absence of
special circumstances, 7 will not consider a legal wrong the use of inside information
by a director in acquiring stock from a stockholder.' 8 On the other hand, directors,
officers and controlling stockholders are fiduciaries as to the corporation and, irre-
spective of proof of honest intention, they will not be permitted to profit at its
expense.19 Legislation which fixes "a standard of conduct by persons acting in a
fiduciary capacity so high as to prevent any possible clash between selfish interest
and faithful performance of duty" has been sustained,20 and even though at times the
innocent may suffer,21 it is not required that only actual cases of evil be struck
at, where the tendency to evil is sought to be eliminated.
22
Although the importance of the case would ordinarily have called for a Supreme
Court opinion, the disposition by denial of a writ of certiorari may be explained by
the fact that only this year in deciding the case of Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion v. Chenery Corp.,23 the members of the court unmistakably expressed their
opinion as in favor of the constitutionality of this type of legislation. The majority
of the court in that case refused to uphold the Commission's interpretation of judi-
cial decisions which the Commission applied in disapproving a plan of reorganization,
which would have permitted the management who had purchased stock during the
reorganization to participate equally in respect of that stock with other holders
of the same class. While the majority were of the opinion that these judicial de-
cisions did not support the disapproval of the plan by the Commission, all members
of the court were of the opinion that Congress (or the Commission under its rule-
making powers) could constitutionally transcend the case law holdings and create a
rule of the type enacted into law by Section 16 (b).
The second problem of construction related to the computation of defendant's
profits. The District Court found the profit, which it directed the defendants to
surrender to the corporation, by matching the prices at which the purchases and sales
of certificates during the six months' period were effected, to achieve the showing
16. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 63 Sup. Ct.
454 (1943).
17. Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 29 Sup. Ct. 521 (1909).
18. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1933); Bawden v. Taylor,
254 11. 464, 98 N. E. 941 (1912). Contra Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232
(1903) ; Steivart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904). 32 MicH. L. REv. 678 (1934) ;
Walker, Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock from His Stockholders, (1923)
32 YALE L. 3. 637.
19. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533 (1919); Munson v.
Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R. R., 103 N. Y. 59 (1886); Blum v. Fleishhacker, 21 Fed.
Supp. 527 (D. S. N. D. Cal., 1937).
20. Otis & Co. v. Ins. Building Corp., 110 F. (2d) 333, 335 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
21. Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 204, 33 Sup. Ct. 44, 46 (1912).
22. Wel v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160, 173, 49 Sup. Ct. 144, 149 (1929). Short-swing specu-
lation on exchanges has been constitutionally forbidden to eliminate the gambling ten-
dency; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 25 Sup. Ct. 425 (1902); Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S.
606, 23 Sup. Ct. 168 (1903).
23. 318 U. S. 80, 63 Sup. Ct. 454 (1943).
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of a maximum profit, without regard to whether the particular certificate sold was
the one purchased in that period. The Circuit Court of Appeals approved this method
of computation which it characterized as "that of lowest price in, highest price out".24
The defendants argued that the profit referred to in Section 16 (b) is that result-
ing from purchases and sales of identical certificates and that as in the case of deter-
mining capital gain or loss for income tax purposes, where the certificates are not
identifiable, the "first in, first out" rule25 should be applied. The court's rejection
of this contention seems sound. Frequently, as in the instant case, a defendant will
be a large stockholder. If the defendant's contention is correct, one of the very facts
which make him subject to the operation of the section will enable him to evade
it, for he may draw upon his reserve of stock to complete a sale. Secondly, the
rule of identification with its substitute, the "first in, first out" rule, is practically in-
applicable to- the case of a profit resulting from a sale followed by a purchase because
of the very remote possibility that the identical certificate sold will be the one re-
acquired. In the case of a sale followed by a purchase at a lower price, the economic
benefit resulting to the stockholder is evident, and the fact that he now possesses
a different certificate is unimportant and should lack legal significance in the appli-
cation of the section. The financial stake of the shareholder in the corporation re-
mains the same and a profit is made because the shareholder has bought back what in
legal effect he had sold, even though it may be evidenced by a different piece of
paper. 26
Under the method of computation adopted by the court no account is taken of
losses on transactions occurring during the six months' period and it is possible that
an insider may be forced to surrender some profits arrived at by applying the "lowest
price in, the highest price out" rule, even though actually he may have sustained
a net over-all loss. However, such a possibility should, not weaken the validity of a
provision, which, we must remember, has for its purpose the elimination of even
the temptation to engage in unfair speculation. A point might also be made of the
fact that the recovery runs to the corporation, whereas the profit is made at the
expense of the particular stockholder from whom the director has withheld the
inside information which he possesses. While it might be argued that there is no
corporate cause of action in such a case,27 the fact is that the insider holds the in-
formation, which he has obtained by virtue of his official position, in trust for the
corporation for whose benefit, it would seem, he should primarily use it. In any event,
24. 136 F. (2d) 231, 239 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
25. Sec. 19.22 (a)-8 of the current Treasury Regulations sets forth this rule as fol-
lows: "If shares of stock in a corporation are sold from lots purchased at different dates
or at different prices and the identity of the lots cannot be determined, the stock sold shall
be charged against the earliest purchases of such stock."
26. A certificate of stock is mere evidence of the shareholder's interest in the corpora-
tion, Pacific National Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227, 11 Sup. Ct. 984 (1891), and "one share
of it is not different in kind or value from every other share of the same issue and
company," Caswell v. Putnam, 120 N. Y. 153, 157 (1890); Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S.
365, 378, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 516 (1908).
27. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 581-582.
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the legislature is not confined to existing theories of legal liability,28 and certainly
there can be no objection to a recovery of the profit by the stockholders as a
corporate group.
29
This important segment of the Securities Exchange Act, like most legislative
innovations, needed judicial clarification.30 The court's full and well reasoned inter-
pretation of Section 16 (b), the first in the nine years the section has been in force,
will do much, it is hoped, to foster that scrupulous observance of their obligations
by corporate fiduciaries, which the Act as a whole, and this provision in particular,
have as their guiding aim and purpose.
EVIDENCE-REHABILITATION OF WITNESS-PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS.-
Plaintiff, a stevedore, was injured while working on a pier, and brought action alleg-
ing that his injuries were the result of the negligence of the defendant's employees.
At the trial, the plaintiff testified that no warning had been given when the plaintiff
was struck. The defendant introduced in evidence a statement made by the plaintiff.
to the defendant's investigator on the day following the accident, in which the plain-
tiff admitted that the warning had been given. The plaintiff then offered a state-
ment furnished by the plaintiff to his employer, six days after the accident, which set
forth the facts as testified to by the plaintiff. This statement was received in" evi-
dence and the plaintiff had judgment. On appeal held, one justice dissenting, the
judgment should be affirmed. Donovan v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., App.
Div. 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 441 (1st Dep't 1943).
Until the eighteenth century, English courts held admissible as corroborating evi-
dence unswom statements made by a witness which were consistent with his testi-
mony.' Today in all jurisdictions such evidence is excluded as unnecessarly, repeti-
tious and the general rule is that the testimony of a witness can not be confirmed
by proving that he made similar declarations out of court.2 An exception is recog-
nized where the witness rests under the imputation of a recently formed motive
to falsify, in which case it may be shown that he made similar statements at a time
when the imputed motive did not exist.3 Where a witness has been impeached by
28. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery, 318 U. S.'80, 63 Sup. Ct. 454
(1943).
29. It should not follow that a recovery an behalf of the corporation will deprive an
individual stockholder of any cause of action which the common law of a particular
jurisdiction may give him against the insider, since such a cause of action would appear to
possess a basis independent of the statute. Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors,
Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act (1939) 38 MIcH. L.
Rav. 133, 144-151.
30. For a discussion of other problems arising under Sec. 16 see Seligman, Problems
Under the Securities Exchange Act (1934) 21 VA. L. REv. 1.
1. Sutterell v. Reynell, 1 Mod. 282 (1682); 1 GREEN'L. Ev, (15th ed.) 605.
2. Rex v. Parker, 3 Doug. 242 (Mich. 1783); Reed v. N. Y. C. R. R., 45 N. Y.
574 (1871).
3. People v. katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 103 N. E. 305 (1913); Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y.
249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915).
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showing that he made a previous statement inconsistent with his testimony, a minority
of jurisdictions admit a prior consistent statement for the purpose of rehabilitating
the witness, apparently on the theory that as an inconsistent statement impairs the
credibility of a witness, so a consistent one goes to strengthen it.4 However, by the
weight of authority, this is not considered a sound exception to the general rule,
since once a self-contradiction is shown, its effect is not lessened by proof of a sup-
porting statement.5
The opinion expressed by Callahan, J., in the Donovan case does not seem to be
in accord with the present New York view. There are dicta in some early New York
cases to the effect that evidence of a prior consistent statement is admissible for the
purpose of rehabilitating a witness who has been impeached by showing that he
made a self-contradictory statement. 6 However, the later case of Robb v. Hackley7
directly held to the contrary, applying the general rule that the testimony of a
contradicted, impeached or discredited witness may not be corroborated by evidence
of consistent statements made out of court. Robb v. Hackley has been followed by
New York courts and the decision appears to be the settled law in this state.8
Justice Callahan's opinion in the Donovan case makes no attempt to bring the case
within the recognized exception to the rule in Robb v. Hackley, that is, where the
testimony is assailed as a recent fabrication.9 The basis of his holding is a view
suggested by Wigmore.10 The theory is that where there is an issue of fact as to
whether or not the witness has uttered the inconsistent statement, the consistency
of his other statements tends to controvert the testimony that he has contradicted
himself.11 However, it would seem that any slight probative value which such evi-
dence might have would be overbalanced by its tendency to introduce incidental
issues and collateral matters. In a case like the principal one, where the witness is a
litigant, the introduction of an inconsistent statement would result in the admissi-
bility of a multitude of declarations which might well have been made for the
purpose of the litigation.
The weight of the opinion as a binding precedent is weakened by the fact that only
one Justice concurred in the opinion.' 2 The other two Justices constituting the
4. Hobbs'v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 32 N. E. 1019 (1893).
5. Werner, J., in People v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 342, 103 N. E. 305 (1913) ; Munson v.
Hastings, 12 Vt., 346, 350 (1839); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 10 Gray 485 (Mass. 1858);
Commorwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N. E. 137 (1905); Leavely v. Harris, 239
Ill. 526, 88 N. E. 238 (1909)
6. Jackson v. Etz, 5 Cow. 314, 320 (N. Y. 1826); People v. Vane, 12 Wend. 78, 79
(N. Y. 1834); People v. Moore, 15 Wend. 419, 423 (N. Y. 1836).
7. 23 Wend. 50 (N. Y. 1840).
8. Dudley v. Bollis, 24 Wend. 465, 472 (N. Y. 1840);. Hill v. Erie R. Co., 225 App.
Div. 19, 232 N. Y. Supp. 66 (1928); Crawford v. Nilan, 289 N. Y. 444, 46 N. E. (2d)
512 (1943).
9. People v. Katz, Ferris v. Sterling, both supra note 3.
10. Ev. (3d Ed.) § 1126.
11. See Cooley, J., in Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 74 (1871).
12. Greenhall v. Davis, 190 App. Div. 632, 180 N. Y. Supp. 525 (1920), afirned Witt
v. Davis, 232 N. Y. 588, 134 N. E. 583 (1922).
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majority merely concurred in the result, apparently on the ground that, if any error
occurred, it was harmless.
INSURANCE-SUBROGATION OF INSURER TO CONDITIONAL VENDOR'S RIGHTS
AGAINST VENDEE.-Plaintiff purchased a tractor under a conditional sales agreement
in which the'plaintiff agreed to keep the tractor insured against fire. The defendant
insurance company issued a policy of fire insurance to the plaintiff "as assuredP' with
a provision that any loss should be paid to the plaintiff and the vendor "as their in-
terests may appear." The policy did not contain a subrogation clause but it
required that notice of cancellation be given to the vendor. The tractor was damaged
by fire to an amount exceeding the balance due upon the sales price, and the plaintiff
brought suit upon the policy. The defendant interposed a counterclaim for the un-
paid purchase price to which it claimed to be entitled by subrogation, alleging that
the plaintiff failed to pay the premium, that the defendant, before the fire, cancelled
the policy by notice to the plaintiff but failed to give such notice to .the vendor,
and that because of this oversight, the defendant was forced to pay the vendor the
amount of the loss and that thereupon the vendor assigned its rights against the
vendee to the defendant. From an order granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss
the counterclaim, defendant appealed. Held, three judges dissenting, the order should
be affirmed. Fields v. Western Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 290 N. Y. 209,
48 N. E. (2d) 489 (1943).
Although the majority opinion in considering the "equities of the situation"
adverts to the defendant's delinquency in failing to cancel the policy as to the vendor,
it should be noted at the outset that this neglect in no wise prejudiced the plaintiff
and should not affect any right of subrogation which the defendant might have.'
While in common parlance it is said that the property is insured, it is clear that
insurance is a personal contract t6 pay a sum of money by way of indemnity to
protect the interest of the, person insured,2 and the vendor and vendee each must
protect his own interest.3 The vendor and purchaser\under a conditional sales con-
tract occupy the same position, so far as the law of insurance is concerned, as mort-
gagee and mortgagor. Both opinions in the principal case proceed on this assump-
tion.4 Where a mortgagee insures for his own benefit, the insurer, upon paying the
1. Miller v. Stark, 61 Ohio St. 413, 56 N. E. 11 (1900). Nor can the insurer be con-
sidered a mere volunteer and, as such, not entitled to subrogation. Wilson v. White, 82
Ark. 407, 102 S. W.'201 (1907).
2. Cromwell v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 42, 47 (1870); Germania Fire Ins.
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 144 N. Y. 195, 39 N. E. 77 (1894); City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468,
504 (1885).
3. Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630 (1925); Rayner v.
Preston (1881) L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 1; 34 YALE L. J. 87 (1924); 25 COL. L. REV. 477 (1925).
Both vendor and vendee have an insurable interest in the property to the extent of. its
full value, Wilkes v. People's Fire Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 184 (1859); Harrison v. Footlage,
161 U. S. 57 (1896). Vigliotti v. Home Ins. Co., 206 App. Div. 398' 201 N. Y. Supp.
407 (2d Dep't 1923).
4. 290 N. Y. 209, 212, 48 N. E. (2d) 489- (1943); also see Langmaid, Subrogation inI
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mortgagee indemnity for loss of the thing damaged or destroyed, is entitled to be
subrogated, to the extent of the payment, to the mortgagee's rights against the
mortgagor, 5 and this has been held to be true even though the insurance policy
contains no express clause providing for subrogation. 6 On the other hand, where a
policy of insurance, either upon its face or by intendment of the parties, insures
the mortgagor, any payment by the insurer, although made to the mortgagee, is to
be considered in satisfaction pro tanto of the mortgage debt, and the insurer is
not entitled to subrogation.7
At the time the policy in the principal case was issued, the New York Insurance
Law made provision for a standard mortgagee clause to the effect that if the insurer
shall claim that no liability exists as to the mortgagor, the insurer shall, to the extent
of any payment to the mortgagee, be subrogated to the latter's right of recovery upon
the mortgage debt.8 Apparently there is no such standard provision in policies insur-
ing the vendor or vendee of a chattel such as a tractor and the policy in the principal
case did not contain one. The majority of the court held that no subrogation would
be permitted, where, as here, the policy had become void as to the vendee, in the
absence of such an express subrogation clause, pointing out that in none of the re-
ported decisions in this state has subrogation been allowed in the absence of such a
clause.9 The dissenting opinion took the position that, assuming the facts alleged
Suretyship and Insurance (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 976, 993. Wood v. North Western Ins.
Co., 46 N. Y. 421 (1871); 3 JONEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed.
revised 1933) 268.
5. Foster v. Van Reed, 70 N. Y. 19 (1877); Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins.
Co., 41 U. S. 495 (1842) ; 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 515.
6. Le Doux v. Dettmering, 316 Ill. App. 98, 43 N. E. (2d) 862 (1942); First Nat. Bank
v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 104 Kan. 278, 178 Pac. 413 (1919); Leyden v. Law-
rence, 79 N. J. Eq. 113, 81 Atl. 121 (1911), affirmed 80 N. J. Eq. 550, 85 Atl. 1134
(1912) ; also see language of Miller, J., in Hastings v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 73 N. Y.
141, 151 (1878); Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So.
807 (1930); Langmaid, Subrogation in Suretyship and Insurance (1934) 47 HAxv. L. REv.
976, 992; Comment, Subrogation of the Insurer to Collateral Rights of the Insured (1928)
28 COL. L. REV. 2b2, 206; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312,
321, 6 Sup. Ct. 1176, 1179 (1886).
7. Kernochan v. N. Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 17 N.'Y. 428 (1858); Waring v. Loder,
53 N. Y. 581 (1873); Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 76 Or. 570, 149 Pac.
542 (1915); Continental Ins. Co. v. Rotholz, 222 Ala. 574, 133 So. 587 (1931); Palmer v.
McFadden, 86 N. J. Eq. 377, 98 Atl. 462 (1916).
8. N. Y. INS. LAW § 168, standard policy, set out in 27 McKnNEY's CoNsormAsED
LAWS 850; also see Law 1943 c. 671, effective July 1, 1943 adopting a new standard fire
policy containing a similar provision. This standard provision must not be confused with
a clause, often referred to as the "standard mortgagee clause", which provides that the
acts or neglect of the mortgagor shal not invalidate the insurance as to the mortgagee.
The New York standard fire insurance policy does not contain such a clause but it may
become part of the contract in the form of a rider approved by the Superintendent of
Insurance. See Hessian Hills Country Club v. Home Ins. Co., 262 N. Y. 189, 186 N. E.
(2d) 439 (1933).
9. The majority opinion cites Hessian Hills Country Club v. Home Ins. Co., 262 N. Y.
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in the counterclaim to be true, the policy became void as to the vendee before the
fire, and that upon equitable principles the insurer was entitled to be subrogated to
the conditional vendor's right to collect the purchase price to the extent of the loss
paid by the insurer.
It is submitted that the view expressed by the dissenting judges is more in accord
with/the principles of law and equity governing the situation disclosed by the plead-
ings. If at the time of the loss the interest of the vendee was no longer actually in-
sured but only that of the vendor, there appears to exist no ground upon which the
vendee can contend that the payment by the insurer should be applied in a satisfac-
tion of the debt.' 0 It is true, as stated in the majority opinion that the policy is
"a separate security for the debt"," but it is not a security obtained for, and paid
for by, the vendee (if we assume, as we must, the truth of the allegation in the
counterclaim), but one existing solely for the benefit of the vendor just the same
as though the vendor had paid for it. Had the vendor after the fire brought suit
against the vendee for the unpaid purchase price, without having sought payment
from the insurance company, it would seem that the vendor would be entitled to
recover.12 If the balance of the purchase price were recovered, the vendor could
not thereafter recover from the insurer3. Not having adopted this procedure, but
the vendor instead having demanded and received the proceeds of the insurance
policy, it would seem that the insurer should be in no worse position but may re-
cover from the vendee to the extent of its payment what the vendor could have
recovered in its own right in the first place. The effect of subrogation, it must be
189, 186 N. E. (2d) 439 (1933) for the proposition that a subrogation clause will not be
supplied by implication. The question of subrogation, however, was not involved in the
cited case. There the claim was made by the insurer that the fraudulent acts of the
mortgagor had voided the policy both as to the mortgagor and mortgagee. The court
agreed that if these acts were proved the policy would be invalidated as to the mortgagee
as well as the mortgagor since the policy did not contain the standard mortgage clause
providing that as to the interests of the mortgagee the insurance "shall not be invalidated
by any act or neglect of the mortgagor" and further held that this provision would not be
supplied by implication. The court did not consider the question whether the subrogation
provision would be supplied by implication if the policy were not invalidated as to the
mortgagee.
10. See notes 5 and 6, supra.
11. 290 N. Y. 209, 214, 48 N. E. (2d) 489, 491 (1943).
12. See note 3, supra; Kingsbury v. Westfall, 61 N. Y. 356 (1875) ; (1901) 1 COL. L.
REv. 311, 313; 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 516.
13. A recovery of the mortgage as well as the insurance money would violate the funda-
mental principle that insurance is a contract 0f indemnity, Vas~cE, INsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930)
653-654; Excelsior Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 55 N. Y.'343 (1873) ; United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 166 U. S. 468, 474, 17 Sup. Ct. 618, 620 (1897). In Massachusetts
it has been held that the mortgagee may collect both the insurance and the mortgage
debt, King v. State Mutual Fire Ins., 7 Cush. (Mass. 1851) 1, except where the policy con-
tains the union or standard mortgagee clause permitting subrogation. as now required
by Gen. L. 1921 c. 175, § 99 (p. 1991) ; Canton Co-op. Bank v. American Cent. Ins. Co.,
219 Mass. 132, 106 N. E. 635 (1914).
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remembered, is to place the insurer in the position of the vendor before the latter
was made whole.14
It is well established that the right of subrogation is not founded upon contract
but upon principles of natural justice and equity.' 5 The determining factor in the
principal case, it would seem, is whether the vendee had any interest in the policy
which would require the application of the proceeds of the insurance to the satisfac-
tion of the indebtedness and which would, therefore, render inequitable the enforce-
ment of the vendor's right to collect the purchase price. This question should not be
determined by a merely formal interpretation of the provisions of the policy. The
fact that the policy still named the vendee as the insured certainly would not appear to
be material if by his failure to pay the premium he had lost the power to enforce
the policy. Neither should the presence or absence of an express subrogation clause
be controlling. Where the right of subrogation is expressed, it may constitute prac-
tically conclusive evidence that the insurance contract was obtained solely for the
vendor's benefit.16 In the absence of any contract for subrogation between the in-
surer and the vendor, subrogation may be denied by proof that the insurance was
in fact procured for the vendee's benefit as well as for that of the vendor. 7 In the
instant case, if the facts alleged in the counterclaim are true, the vendee should be
precluded from advancing any such claim. In any event it would seem that the
counterclaim sets forth facts sufficient to constitute a cabse of action and should
not have been dismissed.18 Decisions in other jurisdictions support the view ex-
pressed by the minority in the principal case.19
Neither the prevailing nor dissenting opinions made point of the fact that, after
payment of the loss by the insurer, the vendor had given to the latter an actual
assignment of its rights against the vendee under the conditional sales contract.
Subrogation has the effect of "an assignment by operation of law"20 so that the
same question was presented whether one views the insurer's rights against the
vendee as based upon a legal assignment or upon the equitable doctrine of subroga-
tion. From either viewpoint, the insurer's right to collect the purchase price will
depend upon whether or not that debt has been paid. Nevertheless, a consideration
of the insurer's 'ights as an assignee at law emphasizes the fundamental point in
the case, which the court's discussion of the right of subrogation tends to becloud,
14. 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) § 2351; 4 WILSTON, CONTRACTS
(Revised ed. 1936) 3619, 3628; Townsend v. Whitney, 75 N. Y. 425 (1878).
15. ARANT, SURETYSHIP (1931) 358; Pittsburgh-Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Kerr, 220
N. Y. 137, 115 N. E. 465 (1917); Dunlop v. James, 174 N. Y. 411, 67 N. E. 60 (1903);
Memphis & Little Rock R. R. v. Dow, 120 U. S. 287, 7 Sup. Ct. 482 (1887).
16. 7 COOLEY'S B, Ers oN INSUANCE (2d ed. 1928) 6722; Foster v. Van Reed, 70 N. Y.
19 (1877).
17. 8 Couch, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1931) 6633; Waring v. Loder, 53 N. Y.
581 (1873) ; Clinton v. Hope Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 454 (1871); Barile v. Wright, 256 N. Y.
1, 175 N. E. 351 (1931).
18. See dissenting opinion of Justice Hill of the Appellate Division in the principal case,
265 App. Div. 891, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 757 (3d Dep't 1942).
19. See note 6, supra.
20. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 141, Comment a.
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namely, whether at the time of the loss the vendee had any interest in the insur-
ance which would require that the insurance moneys be used to satisfy his debt.
The presence or absence of a subrogation clause seems only to be material in so far
as it is evidence which will aid in the solution of that primary question. If the
vendee was not an insured, then the insurer should be entitled to enforce the condi-
tional sales contract like any other assignee.
WAR-TRADING WITH ENEMY AcT-CoppoRATIoN DOMICILED IN ENEMY OCCUPIED
TEmaRroR.-Plaintiff, a French corporation, substantially all of the shares of which
were owned by, a British subject, and which contended that it had ceased operating
in Paris after occupation by the German armed forces, served upon the defendant
a summons and complaint to recover a sum of money on a judgment obtained by
plaintiff in the High Court of Justice in England, King's Bench ,Division, which
affirmed an award in an arbitration proceeding between the parties. Defendant, ap-
pearing specially, moved for an order directing that the summons be vacated and
that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was an unlicensed
non-resident alien enemy and in consequence thereof could not institute or prose-
cute the suit and that the courts of this state lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
action under the common law and under the pertinent sections of the Trading
With the Enemy Act. The Special Term held the plaintiff to be an alien enemy
within the definition of the Trading With the Enemy Act but denied the motion
to vacate the summons and dismiss the complaint and ordered that the action might
proceed to judgment, upon condition that, if and when judgment was 6btained, the
proceeds thereof were to be delivered to the Alien Property Custodian. Both defend-
ant and plaintiff appealed. Held, the orders should be reversed and the motion to va-
cate the service of the summons and dismiss the complaint granted. Drewery v.
Onassis, - App. Div. - 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 74 (1st Dep't 1943).
It has been generally recognized that war suspends the right of a non-resident
alien enemy to prosecute actions in the civil courts.1 While it is sometimes said that
this principle is based on international law,2 it would seem that, like the prohibition
against trading with the enemy, the suspension of the right to sue depends on pro-
visions of municipal law and, in our jurisprudence, both have their source in the
ancient common law3 Both prohibitions have for their aim the prevention of aid
and comfort to the enemy and are designed to frustrate any attempt upon thd part
of the enemy to utilize assets in the destruction of the very country whence the
assets came.
4
1. Ex Parte Colonna, 314 U. S. 510, 62 Sup. Ct: 373 (1942); Porter v. Freudenberg
[1915) 1 K. B. 857. The latter case contains a collation of the authorities discussed by
Lord Chief Justice Reading tracing the historical development of this principle.
2. Cohn v. James C. Gismond Co., 203 App. Div. 453, 454, 197 N. Y. Supp. 41, 42
(1st Dep't 1922); Rothbarth v. Herzfeld, 179 App. Div. 865, 869, 167 N. Y. Supp. 199, 202
(st Dep't 1917), affirmed 223 N. Y. 578, 119 N. E. 1075 (1918).
3. HuBERicH, TH LAw RELATING TO TRADING WITH THE ENEMY (1918) 191; Lord Wright
in Sovfracht (V/O) v. Van Udens Scheepvaart en Agentuur Maatschappij (N. V. Gebr.)
[1943) A. C. 203, 217; Bonneau v. Dinsmore, 23 How. Pr. 397 (N. Y. 1862).
4. Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U. S. 532, 536, 537 (1867).
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To prevent intercourse with the enemy, this country, during World War I, enacted
the Trading With the Enemy Act,5 and the Act has been ratified in the present war.6
This statute makes it unlawful for any person in the United States to trade, or attempt
to trade, either directly or indirectly, with an enemy,7 and the definitions of the
words "to trade" are so broad as to include the payment or satisfaction of any obli-
gation, in fact "any form of business or commercial communication or intercourse". 8
The Trading With the Enemy Act does not expressly prohibit the institution of a suit
by an enemy alien, but it does give recognition to this generally imposed incapacity
by providing that nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to authorize prose-
cution of a suit prior to the end of the war.9 That the incapacity is deemed to exist
is further emphasized by the provisions that an enemy licensed to do business in
the United States by the President as provided for in the Act,10 may prosecute a suit
so far as the same arises solely out of the business transacted within the United States
under such license while in full force and effect," and that an enemy may defend by
counsel any suit which may be brought against him regardless of the nature of
such suit.'?
The decision of the court that the plaintiff could not maintain the action since the
plaintiff had not been licensed to do business in the United States or to collect the
judgment seems to be unquestionably sound.' 3 Maintenance of such a suit would
compel the defendant to trade with the enemy, a transaction made unlawful by the
Act. The definition of "enemy" contained in the Act 14 includes individuals residing
within enemy-occupied territory or residing outside the United States and doing
business within such territory and also corporations incorporated within such terri-
tory15 or incorporated elsewhere outside the United States and doing business within
5. 40 STAT. 411, 416, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 1, 7 (1917).
6. 40 STAT. 1020, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 7 (1918) ratified 55 STAT. 839, 50 U. S. C. A.
App. § 616 (1941).
7. The Trading With the Enemy Act, § 3(a), 50 U. S. C. A. 63. In the footnotes to
this decision the Trading With the Enemy Act will be cited T. E. A.
8. T.E.A. § 2; 50 U. S. C. A. 63.
9. T. E. A. § 7(b) ; 50 U. S. C. A. 71. Rothbarth v. Herzfeld, supra, note 2.
10. T. E. A. § 5(a) ; 50 U. S. C. A. 64.
11. T. E. A. § 7(b); 50 U. S. C. A. 71. Likewise, no disability exists as to acts by
an enemy with regard to copyrights and patents and the protection of their rights thereto,
T. E. A. § 10, 50 U. S. C. A. 83.
12. T. E. A. § 7(b) ; 50 U. S. C. A. 71. See Watts, Watts & Co. v. Union Austriaca Di
Marigazione, 248 U. S. 9, 39 Sup.'Ct. 1 (1918).
13. Steaua Romana Societate v. Woqdman, 2 Fed. Supp. 303, 314 (1931), reversed on
stipulation of the parties, 61 F. (2d) 1047 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).
14. T. E. A. § 2a defines "enemy" for the purpose of the Act to be: "Any individual,
partnership, or other body of individuals, of any natfonality, resident 'within the terri-
tory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which
the United States is at war, or resident outside the United States and doing business within
such territory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with
which the United States is at war or incorporated within any country other than the
United States and doing business within such territory."
15. It seems to be a reasonable construction of the phrase "such territory" to hold
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such territory. The argument advanced by the plaintiff corporation that it did not
carry on business in France after enemy occupation, even if it were established-and
the trial court found that it was not-would seem to be irrelevant in view of the
definition given to an enemy in the, Act. It ignores the fact that the plaintiff is
declared to be an enemy under the Act, not because it does' business in enemy-
occupied territory, 16 but because it was incorporated in such territory. The' primary
concept of an enemy employed in the Act is based upon residence, and just as mere
residence is enough" to characterize an individual as an enemy, so mere incorporation
is apparently sufficient to stamp a corporation as an enemy within the meaning of the
Act without regard to the place in which it does business.'
7
The plaintiff had been licensed to commence arbitration'proceedings in England
and if it had been licensed in this country pursuant to the provisions of the Act, a
quite different question would have been presented. As previously pointed out, the
Trading With the Enemy Act does not expressly prohibit suits by enemies, although
the interdiction of other action by the Act effectively prevents the ingtitution of
suits by enemies.' 8 Section 2 of the Act expressly restricts its definition of "enemy"
to the purposes of trading and of the Act, and it has been said that the prohibition
against the institution and prosecution of suits does not depend upon the provisions
of the Act but rather upon the principles of the common law.19 In the case under con-
sidetation, the fact that the plaintiff comes within the.definition of "enemy" contained
in the Act and is, therefore, a corporation with which it will be unlawful for the
defendant to have the dealings necessitated by a suit, would seem to render it
immaterial whether or not, a$ an abstract proposition, the common law would con-
sider the plaintiff an enemy so far as the law pertaining to suits is concerned. Never-
theless, some confusion may arise in view of certain English decisions, which will
hereafter be noted, and the common law will, therefore, be briefly examined.
There appears to be little, if any, authority in this country (aside from the Act)
on the precise question whether a corporation is an enemy solely on the ground that
it was incorporated in enemy-subjugated territory. 20 Even for the more obvious
that it refers to enemy-occupied territory as well as enemy territory proper; see HUBERICH,
THE LAW RELATING TO TRano WITH THE ENEMY (1918) 61.
16. See Swiss National Ins. Co. v. Miller, 267 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 213 (1925).
17. It might be argued that the last phrase in the statute "and doing business within
such territory" modifies both types of corporations but such a construction seems im-
probable for two reasons: first, because the statutory scheme seems to deal with two
types of corporations the same as it does with individuals resident within and resident
outside every territory; second, because if doing business were intended as the test, there
,would be no need to specify corporations incorporated within enemy territory.
18. HuBERicH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 188.
19. Id. at 46; Sommerich, Recent Innovations in Legal and Regulatory Concepts as to
the Alien and His Property, (1943) 37 Am. JouReAL or INTERNATiONAL LAW 58, in which
at p. 61 the author calls attention to the position taken by the Solicitor General in his
brief amicus curiae filed in Ex Parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 63 Sup. Ct. 115 (1942) to the
effect that by the language employed in § 7 -(6) Congress wished it to be understood'that the
common law pertaining to suits by enemies should remain in effect.
20. Steaua Romana Societate v. Woodman, 2 Fed. Supp. 303, 314 (1931) reversed on
stipulation of the parties, 61 F. (2d) 1047 (C. Cs A. 3d 1932).
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proposition that a corporation is an enemy where it owes its existence to an enemy
state (as distinct from a state merely occupied by the enemy) there is a dearth of
authority.21 However, the precise question we are now considering (i.e., the common
law concept of an enemy as applied to a corporation organized in an enemy-occupied
country) was recently re-examined by the House of Lords in Sovjracht (V/O) v.
Van Udens Scheepvaart en. Agentnur Maatschappij (N. V. Gebr.)22 In that case a
Dutch corporation having its principal place of business in Rotterdam and which had
chartered one of its vessels to a Russian company, sought arbitration in London in
accordance with the provisions of the charter party. When the German armies in-
vaded Holland, the Russian charterer sought to withdraw from the arbitration on
the ground that the Dutch corporation had become a non-resident alien enemy.
Sections 2 and 15 (1) of the English Trading With the Enemy Act of 1939 and regu-
lations issued thereunder provide that corporations doing business in territory
occupied by the enemy shall be defined as enemies for the purpose of the Act and
Section 1 (2) defines prohibited trading as any commercial, financial or other deal-
ing with the enemy and especially the performance of an obligation to an enemy,
except under license.m For purposes of the appeal it was assumed that the Dutch
corporation had received the proper license to engage in trade within the meaning
of the Act, but the question remained whether it rested under the common law dis-
ability which, over and above the provisions of the 'Act, prevented enemy aliens
from instituting or maintaining legal proceedings. The Court of Appeal held that the
Dutch corporation was not an 'enemy at common law, because, to use the language
of Goddard, L. J., "the true doctrine is that enemy character attaches to the trade
and trading property, but not to the person, of a trader who has the misfortune to be
a subject of a state in enemy occupation." 24 The House of Lords reversed, holding
that the definition of an enemy contained in the Act agrees substantially with the
common law definition. "The test is an objective test turning on the relation of the
enemy Power to the territory where the individual voluntarily resides or the com-
pany is commercially domiciled or controlled." 25
Commercial domicile is the factor emphasized by the Lords as determinative of
enemy character. This brings the common law concept of an enemy into substantial
21. Professor Beale cites as authority Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v.
Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105, Fed. Cas. No. 13156 (1814) where a corporation chartered in Great
Britain attempted to institute suit in this country before the War of 1812, 2 BFzAE, CON-
maIcTs os' LAws (1935) § 153.3. A learned English author states that there is only obiter
authority in England, but he concludes that "there is an irrefutable presumption that at
any rate the nationality of the state which brought it into being must be attributed to it.".
McNair, Procedural Capacity of Alien Enemies (1942) 58 L. Q. REV. 191, 214.
22. [1943) A. C. 203.
23. 2 & 3 Geo. VI C. 89 (1939); Defense (Trading With the Enemy) Regulations,
St. R. 0. 1940, No. 1092, Reg. 3.
24. N. V. Van Udens Scheepvaart en Agentuur Maatschappij ([19421 1 K. B. 222, 237,
noted in (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1224.
25. Viscount Simon L. C. in [19431 A. C. 203, 211. At page 218 Lord Wright said: "The
authority given in the present case deals only with the matter of trading with the enemy.
not with the inability of the enemy to proceed in court."
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conformity with that contained in the English Act. The Dutch corporation was an
enemy disabled from suing in a British court because it maintained its principal
office in enemy-subjugated territory and carried on business there; mere technical
domicile arising from its incorporation in an occupied country would not have made
it an enemy. This view is borne out by a more recent English admiralty case,
The Pamia,20 in which it was held that a corporation incorporated in Belgium is
not an enemy disabled from bringing suit since it had transferred its principal office
to the United States, in accordance with decrees of the Belgium government and since
the powers of the directors residing outside of the United States had been suspended
by the corporation.27
Even if commercial domicile were accepted by our courts as the test of an enemy
at common law, it would not accord with the concept employed in our Trading With
the Enemy Act which, as we have seen, is broader than that contained in the English
Act and that announced by the House of Lords in the Sovfracht case. Under our
Trading With the Enemy Act mere incorporation in enemy-occupied territory brings
a corporation within the definition of "enemy" and, without a license granted under
the Act, such a corporation, as the plaintiff in the principal case, would have no
right to maintain suit.
The argument advanced by the plaintiff that, since the one who holds practically
all of its stock resides in England, it is not an enemy, deserves but brief considera-
tion in view of the established doctrine in this country that in determining whether
a corporation is an enemy its nationality is determined by its domicile and not by
that of its shareholders. 28 In this respect also, the English law differs from ours,
since, following the suggestion contained in the decision of the House of Lords in
Dainler Co., Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co.,2 9 that enemy control of a cor-
poration determines its character as an enemy, the English Trading With the Enemy
Act includes within its definition of an enemy a corporation controlled by an
enemy.30
A point in the decision of the -lower court in the principal case 3l which is of special
26. [1943] 1 All E. R. 269.
27. In a very recent decision, Chemacid Societe Anonyme v. Ferrotar Corporation, 51
Fed. Supp. 756 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1943) on facts similar to those in the Pamia (1943)
1 All E. R. 269, a like conclusion was reached. It does not appear from the opinion that
the plaintiff, a Belgium corporation, was licensed under our Trading With the Enemy Act.
If it were not s6 licensed, then it would seem that the maintenance of the suit would con-
stitute a violation of the provisions of our Act. Also see Chemacid v. Rothschild, N. Y.
L. J., Sept. 29, 1943, p. 731, col. 6.
28. Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457, 45 Sup. Ct. 165 (1924). Fritz Schultz,
Jr. Co., Inc. v. Raimes, 99 Misc. 626, 164 1. Y. Supp. 454 (1917) affirmed 100 Misc 697,
166 N. Y. Supp. 567 (1917).
29. [1916] 2 A. C. 307. See also The Hanbourne [119 A. C. 307.
30. English Trading With the Enemy Act § 2 (1c). The same test has been adopted
by the President in Executive Order 8389 dealing with the freezing of property owned by
blocked nationals.
31. 179 Misc. 578, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 688 (1942) ; also see Lederer v. Kahn, 39 N. Y. S.
(2d) 696 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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interest, is its determination that the suit might continue' and that the proceeds of
the judgment, if any, should be delivered to the Alien Property Custodian. The princi-
pal authority relied upon by Special Term is Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye,32 but that
case is clearly distinguishable from the principal one, for in that case judgment had
been obtained in favor of the enemy alien prior to the outbreak of war and the de-
fendant had delayed the collection of it by taking an appeal. Under such circum-
stances the court approved the direction of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the
proceeds of the'judgment be paid to the Alien Property Custodian. However, the
statement of 'Justice Holmes that the objection to the judgment "goes only so far as
it would give aid and comfort to the enemy" 3 has been subsequently quoted by
way of dicta to lend some support to the position taken by Special Term.34 The
distinguishing feature of the Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye case has been noted else-
where35 and a recent writer has criticized the Special Term decision in this respect. 36
The holding of the Appellate Division that there is no authority in statute or
precedent to sustain this feature of the Special Term ruling therefore appears to be
correct.
A subsidiary point is involved in the decision. Since the action was commenced
after the outbreak of war it was proper to dismiss it.37 The weight of authority
considers a stay the proper method of disposal if the suit precedes the outbreak
of war,38 although there are minority holdings that even in that case the suit should
be dismissed.3 9
32. 251 U. S. 317, 4Q Sup. Ct. 160 (1919).
33. Id. at 323.
34. See Ex Parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 63 Sup. Ct. 115, 118 (1942); Petition of Bern-
heimer, 130 F. (2d) 396, 397 (C. C. A. 3d 1942).
35. Lord Wright in Sovfracht (V/O) v. Van Adens Scheepvaart en Agentuur Maat-
schappij (N. V. Gebr.) [1943] A. C.. 203, 236 where he says, "I venture to think that the
English law is correct in considering that the mere fact that the money received could
not go out of the country until the end of the war does not exclude the rule forbidding
to an enemy a right of suit,'-' citing the language of Lord Sumner in Rodriquez v. Speyer
Brothers [1919] A. C. 59, 114.
36. DoMxE, Trading Witlh The Enemy In World War II (1943) pp. 222-226.
37. Cohn v. James C. Gismond & Co., supra note 2; Hans v. Hilker, 21 Ohio N. P. N. S.
57 (1919); Munford v. Munford, 1 Gall. 366, Fed. Cas. No. 9918 (C. C. 1812).
38. Plattenberg v. Kalmon, 241 Fed. 605 (D. C. S. . Ga. 1917); Hungarian General
Credit Bank v. Titus, 182 App. Div. 826, 169 N. Y. Supp. 926 (1st Dep't 1918); Rau v.
Rowe, 184 Ky. 841, 213 S. W. 226 (1919).
39. Howes v. Chester, 33 Ga. 89 (1861); Dumenko v. Swift Canadian Co., 32 Ont.
L. Rep. 87 (1914).
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